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Abstract: Kline’s functional categories for the evolution of teaching blur some 
valuable distinctions. Moreover, her account provides no answer to the 
question of why direct active teaching seems to be a uniquely human 
phenomenon. 
 
We admire Kline’s attempt to illuminate the evolution of teaching via a 
taxonomy of different varieties, and by considering the adaptive pressures 
and costs that might lead to their emergence. At the same time, we doubt that 
Kline’s theoretical distinctions are the best formulations. 
 
Kline defines ‘stimulus enhancement’ as occurring when “the teacher 
stimulates the pupil’s interest in a stimulus or location” (lines 609-610). In 
thereby characterising it as including cases in which a teacher intentionally 
draws attention to something, Kline departs from standard usage of this term 
(e.g., Whiten & Ham 1992) in comparative psychology, in which one agent’s 
activities make salient to another some valuable information. Importantly, on 
this usage, enhancement can be provided even when an agent is oblivious to 
the presence of an onlooker – and so is cognitively undemanding. Since Kline 
includes as examples of stimulus enhancement cases of pointing that are 
typically thought cognitively difficult (Clark 1996; Tomasello 2008; Moore 
2013b), her taxonomy glosses cognitive issues that have been considered 
foundational in the evolution of human cognition. While Kline motivates her 
functional approach by stating that behaviour (and not cognition) is the target 
of natural selection, a taxonomy that lumps together behaviours supported by 
different cognitive abilities and appearing in only distantly related clades is not 
intuitively a useful tool for understanding evolution. It may lead researchers 
both to over-estimate the relatedness of different behaviours on account of 
functional similarities, and to overlook the similarity of cognitively related 
behaviours performed with different functions.  
 
It’s also not clear to us that Kline’s terminological distinctions are illuminating. 
For example, while she describes the flossing of teeth by long-tailed 
macaques (Masataka 2009) as a form of stimulus enhancement, the same 
behaviour is also consistent with her criteria for direct active teaching – since 
it could well be characterised as a “non-verbal demonstration, punctuated with 
exaggerated movements, by an expert ... to a novice” (ibid. lines 658-659). 
Indeed, we often engage in direct teaching by drawing others’ attention to 
important features of objects - suggesting that Kline’s categories are also not 
mutually exclusive. It is also hard to see why the cases of informative pointing 
that Kline counts as stimulus enhancement are not cases of active (albeit pre-
verbal) teaching; and why the Warao father’s adjustment of his son’s wrist is a 
case of direct active teaching, and not evaluative feedback. 
 
The confusions caused by these overlapping categories are unlikely to 
facilitate identification of cases of teaching in the animal kingdom. Moreover, 
they undermine our confidence that this new theoretical framework could be 
used to generate new scenarios for testing for the presence of teaching. 
Consequently, while Kline’s categories are thought-provoking, it’s not clear 
that they improve on the categories of social learning already described by 
others (e.g., Whiten & Ham, 1992). 
 
In fact, we doubt that Kline has over-estimated cases of active teaching - at 
least among chimpanzees. Since chimpanzees are among our nearest living 
relatives, their teaching activities are of great interest for understanding the 
evolution of our own. We agree with Kline that intentional and ‘theory of mind’ 
based teaching approaches sometimes overstate the social cognition that 
active teaching requires (Moore 2013a), and so agree that “the constraints of 
cognition ... do not seem sufficient to explain why direct active teaching 
appears to be limited to humans” (lines 1325-1326). But then why isn’t more 
active teaching found in chimpanzees? 
 
It seems unlikely that researchers have simply been looking in the wrong 
place, because several groups (Matsuzawa et al., 2001; Lonsdorf, 2006; 
Dean et al., 2012) have tried and failed to substantiate earlier reports (Boesch 
1991). Kline’s emphasis on adaptive value may hold out an answer here.  
 
Boesch (1991; 2012), has argued that chimpanzee mothers at Taï teach their 
children how to crack panda nuts. Because the Panda oleasa is particularly 
hard and difficult to crack, juvenile chimpanzees don’t typically succeed until 
they are eight years old. Since the chimpanzee interbirth interval is five years, 
Boesch argues that the demands of having two dependent offspring may push 
mothers to accelerate their offspring’s learning. We find this explanation 
unlikely. While the panda nut may be highly valued, it constitutes neither a 
large nor an ineliminable part of the Taï chimpanzee diet (Boesch & Boesch-
Achermann 2000, p. 210, themselves describe Panda nut consumption as 
“rare” and “irregular”). Thus, there is likely to be little adaptive pressure for 
teaching this skill. Given the scant evidence of teaching in chimpanzees, and 
the failure of others to find further evidence supporting Boesch’s reports, it 
seems advisable to doubt that it’s really happening. Why would this be? 
 
One answer favoured by Kline and others (e.g., Gergely & Csibra 2005) is 
that behaviours that are both complex and difficult to learn through 
observation should lead to pressures for the emergence of teaching. Since 
naive captive individuals have already proven able to reinvent various wild 
“cultures” without social learning (Huffman & Hirata 2004; Allritz, Tennie & 
Call 2013; Menzel et al. 2013), such opaque behaviours may not exist in 
chimpanzee culture. Therefore non-teaching learning mechanisms may 
suffice for the propagation of contemporary chimpanzee technologies – 
including different forms of observational learning, individual learning, and 
inherited cognitive skills (Tennie et al. 2009, 2012; Moore, 2013a). This may 
be true even for the most complex multi-tool sets (e.g., Sanz & Morgan, 2007; 
Boesch, Head & Robbins, 2009). 
 
We suspect that chimpanzees have simply faced little adaptive pressure for 
tools and tool-sets more complex than those that they already possess. Since 
they were never forced to leave their ecological niches, simpler forms of 
learning and social learning always sufficed for them to acquire whatever 
tools, tool-sets and communicative devices they needed. This would explain 
the lack of pressure for active teaching, not to mention the comparative 
absence in chimpanzees of high-fidelity learning mechanisms like imitation. 
Given her closing comments about the adaptive value of teaching, we think 
Kline would agree with this conclusion. But it’s not clear why we needed her 
theoretical framework to get there.  
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